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WILLS
COLEMAN KARESH*
Charges
Cases are frequent in which the question has arisen whether
a testator has imposed a charge on land or personal property,
usually the former,1 but not so common are those dealing
with the personal liability of a legatee or devisee of property
charged. In Meyerson v. Malinow,2 both of these aspects were
considered. The testator's will gave his two sons all the capital
stock of a close corporation and provided: "As a charge upon
such stock * * ** I direct that my said sons pay to my wife
* * * or cause to be paid to her by [the corporation] the sum
of fifty dollars a week accumulated from my death, as long,
during her life of widowhood, as she shall reside in Spartan-
burg County. No duty or responsibility with respect to the
making of these payments to my wife is placed upon my
executors as such, it being my expressed intention to confine
this obligation personally to my sons against whose bequest
of stock it is made a charge." The sons were children by a
former marriage. They made the weekly payments of $50.00
for a time, and when the payments were discontinued the
widow brought this action to require payment of past due
and future installments. The sons filed an answer, substan-
tially a general denial, and interposed a counterclaim for
sums allegedly due them. Both the master and the circuit
court found against the counterclaim and held the sons per-
sonally liable for the arrearages in the monthly payments.
During the pendency of the action the wife died and the
named plaintiff, her executor, was substituted.
The Supreme Court affirmed the action of the lower court.
The contention of the sons was that a fiduciary relationship
or trust had been created, but the court held that the provision
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. Of which perhaps the best known in South Carolina are Laurens
v. Read, 14 Richardson Equity 245 (S. C. 1868); Moore v. Davidson,
22 S. C. 92 (1884); Jaudon v. Ducker, 27 S. C. 295, 3 S. E. 465 (1885);
Allen v. Ruddell, 51 S. C. 366, 29 S. E. 198 (1897); DLxon v. Roessler,
76 S. C. 415, 57 S. E. 203 (1907); Patterson v. Cleveland, 165 S. C.
266, 163 S. E. 784 (1932); Shired v. Nesbit, 90 S. C. 20, 72 S. E. 545
(1911); Mack v. Stanley, 190 S. C. 300, 2 S. E. 2d 792 (1939).
2. 231 S. C. 14, 97 S. E. 2d 88 (1957).
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in the -will created a charge - which is obvious from the use
of the term itself in the will - and that in a charge there
is no fiduciary relationship between the holder of the prop-
erty subject to the charge and the equitable encumbrancer.3
The patent purpose of the sons' contention to this end was to
assert that they were trustees and their liability, if any, lim-
ited to the bequeathed property or its value.
Following general authority, and specifically the South
Carolina case of Shired v. Nesbit,4 it was held that the accept-
ance of the property subject to the charge imposed upon the
sons a personal liability to discharge the obligation, under
the rule, as stated in the Shired case, that "one who accepts
a devise coupled with an obligation binds himself by his ac-
ceptance of the devise to discharge the obligation." And the
court quotes from 57 Am. Jur., 1010, the following: " * * * the
weight of modern authority supports the conclusion that when
a devisee accepts lands which have been charged with a
legacy, he becomes personally liable for the payment thereof,
unless, of course, the language of the will negatives any testa-
torial intention to charge the devisee personally. This rule,
it has been said, rests upon the reasonable principle that he
who takes a benefit under a will must take it subject to its
provisions, so that the acceptance of the devise imports a
promise to pay the legacy."0, Because of the personal duty
to discharge the obligation, liability extends to the amount of
3. Citing Restatement of Trusts, Section 10, which points out that
an equitable charge is not a trust, although the interest of the bene-
ficiary of a charge, like the interest of the beneficiary of a trust, is
equitable. In the charge, the beneficiary has an equitable security inter-
est; in the trust, the beneficiary has equitable ownership. Whether a
trust or charge or condition has been created is a matter of interpreta-
tion; but, as indicated, there is no room in the will in question for
anything but a charge. There are of course several vital distinctions
between a trust and a charge, not the least of which is the matter of
the statute of limitations: while ordinarily the statute is not applicable
in the case of a trust (as between beneficiary and trustee), it is opera-
tive in the case of a charge. Dixon v. Roessler, 76 S. C. 415, 57 S. E. 203
(1907).
4. Note 1, supra.
5. The references to devises are of course not exclusive; and legacies,
or personal property, may, as here, be charged. In most cases the pay-
ment of a legacy is made a charge upon property transferred by the
will, but the obligation may not be to pay a legacy - which is what a
testator gives - but for the transferee alone to make the payment. In
such cases the testator himself makes no gift, or gives no legacy, to the
beneficiary. That was expressly the case here. Typical of charges which
are not imposed to satisfy legacies are those for support; the testator
makes no provision for support out of his estate, but the devisee of
property charged for the purpose must do so. Shired v. Nesbit is such
a case; so also is Mack v. Stanly, note 1, supra.
[Vol. 10
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the obligation and not to the value of the property, so that the
testamentary transferee of charged property may find in a
given situation that he is binding himself to pay more than
the value of the property he has acquired - a case in which
he would be the loser.6
ADEMPTION
Two cases involving ademption were before the court in
the period under survey. Both treat the problem of ademption
extensively, and coincidentally both deal directly or indi-
rectly with the question of ademption of the proceeds of spe-
cific subject matter.
In Watson v. Watson,7 the testator, by Item Three of his
will, bequeathed, after a specific legacy, all the remainder
of his personal estate to his wife. By the next item he de-
vised all his real estate, described as 140 acres, more or less,
in Greenville County, to his wife for life, with remainder to
certain of his nieces and nephews. By Item Six he provided:
"In the event I should sell any of my real estate, prior to my
death, the proceeds therefrom shall go to my said wife for
and during the term of her natural life, and at her death to
my said nieces and nephews * * * . " Shortly after making
the will the testator sold off 121 acres of the land and de-
posited the net proceeds of about $19,000 in a savings and
loan association, receiving a certificate representing invest-
ment shares in that amount. He later withdrew $8,000 and
therewith bought a house and lot - the consideration being
$8,500, the source of the remaining $500 not being disclosed.
Afterwards the testator sold the remainder of the 140 acres
for $8,000, of which he deposited 7,500 in the same savings
and loan association. A total of $900 was withdrawn for re-
pairs to property and for personal use. On the testator's
death $18,000 was on deposit to testator's credit, evidenced by
certificate.
6. This is clearly indicated in Shired v. Nesbit. See in accord Annot.,
116 A. L. R. 7,19 (1938).
Since the whole matter is one of the testator's intention, it is possible
for the testator both to make a charge and to impose personal liability,
as in the usual case and in the Meyerson case. See, also, Morgan v.
Smith, 59 S. C. 49, 37 S. E. 43 (1900), where both may be made subject
to a condition precedent. The testator may create a charge, but not
impose a personal liability. Scott on Trusts, Section 10.1. Or, "the tes-
tator may manifest an intention to impose a personal liability upon the
devisee, if he accepts the property devised, but not to charge the land."
Scott, op. cit. A case of this last kind seemingly is Kirkpatrick v. Ches-
nut,.5 S.C. 216 (1873).
7. 230 S. C. 247, 95-S. E. 2d 266 (1956).
1957]
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In this litigation the widow contended that she was entitled
to the $18,000 deposit as personal property passing under
Item Three, and that she was also entitled to a one-half in-
terest in the house and lot purchased by the testator as after-
acquired intestate property. The lower court's decision was
adverse to her claims, and on appeal the Supreme Court af-
firmed.
The first contention of the appellant was that the term
"any" in Item Four did not mean "all" and that since the
testator had sold all his property, the clause was inoperative.
This the court dismissed, saying that it was clear that the
word "any" was intended to mean "all" as well.
The critical contention of the widow was that the sale of
the real estate and the subsequent handling of the proceeds
adeemed the gift in toto. The Supreme Court declined to ac-
cept this view, holding that the gift was of the proceeds of
specific subject matter, as distinguished from a gift of the
subject matter itself, and that since the proceeds were capable
of tracing and identification there was not, under the au-
thority of Gist v. Craig,8 any ademption except to the extent
of the money withdrawn from the deposit. The court differ-
entiated this case from Stanton v. David,9 on the ground that
while in that case there was a gift of proceeds there was no
segregation of funds or identification as here, nor was there
any "provision in the will for the proceeds of anticipated sale
in consonance with the devise, as in the instant case." It
must be said, however, that in the Stanton case the stress was
more on the question of when the will spoke than on the matter
of identification. Since here the proceeds were converted into
the deposit and into the house and lot, it was held that these
items passed under item six to the wife for life, with remain-
der as provided.
If the proposition is accepted, as it manifestly must be
under the Gist case, that a gift of proceeds is not adeemed
if they are traced and identified, 10 the conclusion in the pres-
8. 142 S. C. 407, 141 S. E. 26 (1927), where testatrix directed her
executors to collect certain notes and mortgages and pay over to a
legatee, and the testatrix collected them herself, the proceeds being
identified at her death. The general rule is in accord. Annot., 165 A.
L. R. 1032 (1946).
9. 193 S. C. 108, 7 S. E. 2d 852 (1940).
10. Precisely what is required for tracing and identification is not
clear. It is plain in this case and in the Gist case that particular prop-
erty was the converted form of the proceeds and that they had been
segregated from general assets, something impossible on both counts
to show in the Stanton case. Suppose, however, that the testator, having
[Vol. 10
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ent case is clearly sound. In truth, the case is even stronger
than in the type of situation represented by the Gist case,
since there the testator makes no specific disposition of the
proceeds in the event he should dispose of the property during
his lifetime - the law making it for him -, whereas in this
case the testator made specific provision for the disposition
of the proceeds in the contingency of sale by him. Of course,
if there is a specific legacy which is the subject of a gift,
its sale adeems the legacy and the proceeds or other property
given in exchange or acquired with the proceeds are not sub-
stituted;" but where the testator himself makes the substi-
tution, he himself guards against the revocation or ademption
that might otherwise occur. The argument of course for
ademption was not so much that the devise of the land had
been revoked or adeemed, but that the gift of the proceeds
had been, because the proceeds thereunder had taken a new
form and in their new form did not answer the description in
the will. But any such construction is almost self-defeating
and would make the clause in question meaningless, since,
unless the proceeds are cash which is retained in specie, or an
uncashed check, or property given in exchange, the proceeds
almost invariably are converted. In the usual transaction,
where the proceeds are represented by check of a purchaser,
the deposit of the check itself converts the form of the pro-
ceeds into a debt of the bank to the depositor.
The terms "revoked" and "adeemed" have been used above
by the writer, it should be noted, more or less interchangeably,
but the former term has been employed because of the fact
of a devise. It is interesting to observe the comments of Mr.
Chief Justice Stukes, writer of the opinion, on the use of these
terms, so interesting in fact as to warrant setting them out
in full as a valuable contribution to the history of the law of
wills:
"The terms adeem and ademption have been used by court
sold the property, deposited the proceeds in a bank account already
standing in his name, so that there was commingling. There would be
tracing but hardly identification. In the field of trusts that fact has
not presented any difficulty, and, subject to the rules as to with-
drawals, a trust claim can be asserted against the fund to the extent
of trust money so deposited. See Wulbern v. Timmons, 55 S. C. 456, 33
S. E. 568 (1899) ; Patterson v. Jones, 99 S. C. 128, 82 S. E. 1008 (1914) ;
White v. Bank, 60 S. C. 122, 38 S. E. 453 (1900). Of course no trust
is involved in the ademption cases, but it would seem that the analogy
as to mixing funds is appropriate.
11. Annot., 3 A. L. R. 1497 (1919), see also Rikard v. Miller, 231 S. C.
98, 97 S. E. 2d 257 (1957), next reviewed.
1957]
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and counsel in this case as applicable to legacies and devises,
which is contrary to the early cases where the doctrine which
they denote was held applicable only to bequests, not devises.
1 Bouvier, Rawle's 3rd Revision, 134. 69 C. J. 1001, Wills,
Sec. 2201. Allen v. Allen, 13 S. C. 512, 36 Am. Rep. 716. God-
bold v. Vance, 14 S. C. 458. Cf. Hunter v. Mills, 29 S. C. 72,
6 S. E. 907, 911, where it was said: "It seems to us that,
somewhat like an 'adeemed' legacy, it [a devise] must simply
go out of the will.' hla However, apparently beginning in this
country with the case of Hansbrough's Ex'rs. v. Hooe, 12
Leigh, 316, 39 Va. 316, 37 Am. Dec. 659, later decisions have
applied the doctrine eo nomine to devises of realty as well
as bequests of personalty. But in the case at bar there was no
ademption, except in part, in either of the meanings of the
term because, perforce, Item VI of the will and the segrega-
tion by the testator of the funds devised from the sales of
his lands, the gift was not taken away. The terms are devised
from the Latin, ademptio, which means a taking away."
If these remarks are to be taken as a judicial substitution
of "ademption" for "revocation" in the case of devises, then
indeed is it "a consummation devoutly to be wished," not
only because the result is the same where the gift, whether
of land or personalty, is taken from the beneficiary, but
because the law elsewhere uses the single term "adeem.
' 12
Ila. See a similar expression in reverse in Long v. Weir, 2 Richardson
Equity 283 (S. C. 1846), where testator bequeathed a slave to the plain-
tiff and afterwards gave the slave to defendant's wife: "The gift to
the defendant's wife was an ademption of the legacy to complainant;
and, as to that, operates as a revocation of the will."
12. But until this decision, despite the trend, the South Carolina cases
speak of the withdrawal of the devise as revocation. One of the earliest
cases is Haynesworth v. Cox, Harper Equity 117 (S. C. 1824), where it
is said "It has been solemnly settled that a sale of land, after a devise
and before the death of the testator, is a revocation of the devise; and
the money on the sale thereof becomes personal estate and is distributed,
or passes under the residuary clause, under the facts of the case." Other
cases holding that a conveyance revoked or would revoke a devise:
Thompson v. Thompson, 2 Strobhart Law, 48 (S. C. 1847); McFadden
v. Lumpkin, 112 S. C. 431, 100 S. E. 168 (1919); Godbold v. Vance,
14 S. C. 453 (1880), cited in the decision; Clinton v. McKeown, 39 S. C.
21, 17 S. E. 504 (1892); Gable v. Rauch, 50 S. C. 95, 27 S. E. 555
(1897); Hunter v. Mills, 29 S. C. 72, 6 S. E. 907 (1888), cited in the
decision; Pinson v. Pinson, 150 S. C. 368, 148 S. E. 211 (1928) holding
devise revoked by subsequent contract of sale by testator; Stanton v.
David, note 9, supra; Drake v. Drake, 148 S. C. 147, 145 S. E. 705 (1928).
On related questions, where doctrine of revocation acknowledged, see
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 7 Richardson Equity 201 (S. C. 1855), transfer of
devised land for purposes of security not operative as revocation; Doug-
lass v. Dickson, 11 Richardson Law 417 (S. C. 1858), contract by
testator to sell -devised land does not revoke authority to executors to
effect division, and executors may carry out contract.
6
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Then, too, the adoption of the single term would remove the
awkward posture which appears in many revocation cases
dealing with the question of whether there can be such a
thing as "implied revocation" or "revocation by circum-
stances," the courts declaring that, in the presence of the
revocation statutes,13 there can be no revocation by implica-
tion but only revocation under the statutes,14 and explaining
away the term "revocation" when the land devised had been
disposed of by the testator as "revocation from necessity."15
But if "ademption" will, as a result of the decision, take
the place of "revocation" for devises, it by no means follows
that the statement of the Chief Justice that the doctrine of
ademption was held to be inapplicable to devises must now
be taken as no longer true, or that the revised statement
should be "the doctrine of ademption applies to devises."
The reason is that "ademption" is used in two senses: one in
the sense in which it has heretofore been employed - ex-
tinction, withdrawal, alienation or disappearance of the sub-
ject matter; and the other in the sense of satisfaction, where-
under a legacy is treated as satisfied - and on that account
adeemed or taken out of the will - by payment or other
gift to the legatee.16 There is an important distinction be-
tween the two types of ademption even in those states where
ademption by alienation applies to devises: in the vast ma-
jority of jurisdictions the doctrine of ademption by satisfac-
tion does not apply to devises - that is to say, a devise can-
not be satisfied by subsequent transactions short of a convey-
ance to the devisee himself, no matter what the intention.Y7
The South Carolina cases are squarely in keeping with this
13. Now CODE OF LAWS OF S. C., 1952 §§ 19-221, 19-222.
14. Verdier v. Verdier, 8 Richardson Law 135 (S. C. 1815); Allen v.
Allen, 13 S. C. 512, 36 Am. Rep. 716 (1879); Scaife v. Tompson, 15 S. C.
337 (1880); Prater v. Whittle, 16 S. C. 40 (1881); Gregg v. McMillan,
54 S. C. 378, 32 S. E. 447 (1898).
15. Prater v. Whittle, 16 S. C. 40 (1881).
16. 4 PAGE, WILLS, §§ 1533 et seq. (3rd Ed. 1941); Annot., 26 A. L. R.
2d 9 (1923); Guignard v. Mayrant, 4 DeSaussure Equity 614 (S. C.
1816); Richardson v. Richardson, Dudley Equity 184 (S. C. 1838); Allen
v. Allen, 13 S. C. 512 (1879); Godbold v. Vance, 14 S. C. 458 (1880);
Gregg v. McMillan, 54 S. C. 378, 32 S. E. 447 (1898). Whether satisfac-
tion, wholly or pro tanto, takes place is a matter of intention, but the
intention of the testator in subsequent acts or conduct plays no part in
ademption by extinction. Rogers v. Rogers, 67 S. C. 168, 45 S. E. 176
(1903).
17. 4 PAGE, WILLS, § 1549 (3rd Ed. 1941); ATKINSON, WILLS, Section
133 (2nd Ed. 1953).
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view,18 and it is primarily in this sense that they declare
the principle that "the doctrine of ademption does not apply
to devises of real estate." These cases are of course not over-
turned by the decision in the case under review, and infer-
ences drawn from the discountenancing of "revocation" as a
suitable term and the approval of "ademption" must be re-
stricted to only one of the senses in which that latter term
is used. At best the conclusion that must be drawn is that a
devise, like a legacy, may be adeemed by alienation, but that
a devise may not be adeemed by satisfaction, even though the
distinction is logically not a sound one.19
The second of the ademption cases before the Supreme
Court in the period under survey is Rikatrd v. Miller.20 The
action was brought for construction of a will. After providing
for payment of his debts, the testator gave a legacy to a
grandson, and by the next, the third, item of his will gave his
wife his residence together with "whatever automobile for
personal use I have at the time of my death, together with all
monies and all personal property left after payment of the
specific legacies and bequests herein and all my debts." The
fourth, and here the crucial, item gave "my business called
'Miller's Termite Control', including trucks, equipment, stock
and good will * * * to be equally divided among my children
living at the time of my death, and among the child or chil-
dren of any deceased child of mine, other than my grandson
James Bruce Miller, such child or children to take the share
18. Godbold v. Vance, 14 S. C. 458 (1880); Allen v. Allen, 13 S. C. 512
(1879) ; Gregg v. McMillan, 54 S. C. 378, 32 S. E. 447 (1898).
19. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, Section 14.13 (1st Ed. 1952).
The case that Mr. Chief Justice Stukes cites as originating the change
in this country - Hansbrough's Ex'rs v. Hooe, 12 Leigh 316, 39 Va. 316,
37 Am. Dec. 659 (1841) - holds that a devise may be adeemed by sub-
sequent advancements, and stands more for this proposition than for
refutation of a distinction between ademption and revocation.
It has been stated that the reason why revocation applied to devises -
and ademption did not - where the property was alienated was bound
up with the rule against the devising of after-acquired real estate, and
that with the elimination of the rule by statute in the various states the
reason against ademption ceased. Page on Wills, See. 1489; American
Law of Property, See. 14.13. The common law rule in South Carolina
that after-acquired real property could not pass by will was abolished
by statute in 1858, under what is now Sec. 19-231 of the 1952 Code, and
if the rule was the justification for revocation in opposition to ademp-
tion, its elimination should serve as a further, though technical, ground
for the substitution. Nevertheless, all the South Carolina cases since
1858 have spoken of revocation, without, however, adverting to the pos-
sible effect of the statute in terms of substitution of expression or doc-
trine. See note 12, supra.
20. 231 S. C. 98, 97 S. E. 2d 267 (1957).
[Vol. 10
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of the deceased parent. In case there are no monies left in
my estate at the time of my death, my automobile and other
personal property hereinabove bequeathed to my wife shall
be sold for the payment of my debts and the legacy to James
Bruce Miller, the business called 'Miller's Termite Control'
not to be subject to the payment of my debts and legacies
in the remaining items of the within will, until other personal
property has been exhausted."
The testator was twice married, his second wife being the
wife mentioned in the will. The children were children of
his first marriage.
Shortly before his death the testator sold the business re-
ferred to in the fourth item for $25,000, of which $4,000 was
paid in cash and the remaining $21,000 was represented by
a note and chattel mortgage, a part of his estate at his death.
The contention of the wife was that the bequest had been
adeemed by the sale and that the proceeds, both cash and
security, had passed to her under the residuary third item.
The contention of the children and grandchildren was that
ademption had not taken place, but that if it had the proceeds
of the sale passed as intestate property. The lower court held
for the wife in both respects - that there had been an ademp-
tion and that the proceeds went to her. The Supreme Court
held that ademption had taken place but reversed as to the
disposition of the proceeds of sale - holding that they passed
as intestate property. (This phase of the case will be dis-
cussed under the heading of "Lapse and Residue" hereafter).
In sustaining the lower court's determination that ademption
had occurred, the Supreme Court rejected the argument of the
appellants that from the will's language and because of the
nature of the legacy and other factors the executor was im-
pliedly directed to sell the business and that there was thus
a gift of proceeds which, being identifiable, would not be
adeemed by the testator's sale. The court, recognizing the
rule in Gist v. Craig, fortified by Watson v. Watson, just dis-
cussed, declared that this case was unlike the two mentioned,
in that the will did not show that "the testator contemplated
any change in the form of the bequest or legacy, nor does it
show that he intended to pass the proceeds in the event he
disposed of such business." This, then, being a specific legacy
of designated subject matter, and not of its proceeds, there
was ademption in toto, the court noting that "it has been
1957]
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said that in the case of specific gifts of property, the non-
existence of the property at the death of the testator, or its
consumption, loss, disposal by sale, gift or other alienation,
during the lifetime of the testator, works an ademption of the
legacy."
Lapse and Residue
Under this heading are cases in which the question has been
as to whether a gift has lapsed - using the term in the broad
sense of failure from any cause instead of the more limited
sense of failure because of the death of a legatee or devisee
during the testator's lifetime - and as to its disposition if
there has been a lapse: whether as intestate property or into
a residuary clause. The further, and related, question is as
to the scope of residuary clauses, not limited to their possible
function of catching lapsed gifts but other property as well.
In Padgett v. Black,21 the question of lapse and ultimate dis-
position arose under a will which gave property to a bene-
ficiary who was dead at the time of the making of the will.
The disposition was in the general residuary clause of the
will which provided that the residuary estate be divided into
eight equal shares, the last part reading: "One eighth ('/8)
part to be paid to the child of my deceased sister, Elizabeth
B. Padgett, to him absolutely and forever." The beneficiary
was dead when the will was made, and that fact was known
to the testatrix. The plaintiffs were the only children of
the deceased beneficiary, and their contention, in this action
to construe the will, was that they were the intended bene-
ficiaries under the quoted section. The lower court agreed
with this contention, reaching its conclusion by findings, in
the language of the opinion, "that the testatrix knew at the
time of the making of her will that the only child of her de-
ceased sister, Elizabeth B. Padgett, had died about three years
before and that the plaintiffs were the only children of such
child; that she did not intend to die intestate; that she in-
tended by item four of her will to distribute the residue of
her estate; that she intended for the eight branches of her
immediate kindred each to take one-eighth part in the residue;
that no branch would receive a greater amount than any other
branch of the family; that if the one-eighth part designated
to the son of Elizabeth B. Padgett is invalid, then this branch
of the family would take nothing and defeat her manifest in-
21. 229 S. C. 142, 92 S. E. 2d 153 (1956).
[Vol. 10
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tention that this branch should be represented ':: ** and
that the general scheme of the will was such that the tes-
tatrix intended that the children of Oliver W. Padgett, Sr.,
should take their father's part." The decree, as a reading of
the transcript of record will show, concurred in the plaintiffs'
position on two grounds, either alternative or cumulative:
(1) that the plaintiffs were substitutional beneficiaries; (2)
that, on applying the will, it being ascertained that the bene-
ficiary named was dead and that the testatrix knew it, a latent
ambiguity arose as to the meaning of the terms employed,
which, under the extrinsic facts, would be resolved into a
conclusion that the plaintiffs were the original beneficiaries
under the description in the controversial clause. The briefs
of the parties were directed to both of these aspects of the
case. On appeal the lower court was reversed. In an informa-
tive review of the authorities, the court followed the rule that
a gift to a beneficiary dead at the making of the will is void
ab initio, even though the fact was known to the testator;
that lapse or failure was not prevented by the anti-lapse stat-
ute,22 which applies only to gifts to children and which in
any event does not operate where a legatee is dead when
the will is made; and from a reading of the whole will that
there was no substitutional provision which would guard
against the failure of the gift. The authorities urged by the
claimants in support of the substitutional contention were
distinguished, particularly the cases of Dent v. Dent23 and
Ex Parte Newton,24 where gifts to legatees that might other-
wise have lapsed because of their deaths before the testator
were saved by codicils which were designed to substitute bene-
ficiaries.2 5 The conclusion reached by the court is clearly
sound, although it is perhaps to be regretted that it did not,
in the opinion, take note of the constructional problem raised
in the pleadings, briefs and decree - namely, whether there
22. CODE OF LAWS OF S. C., 1952, § 19-237.
23. 113 S. C. 416, 102 S. E. 715 (1919).
24. 183 S. C. 379, 191 S. E. 59 (1937).
25. These two cases, while different on the facts from the present case,
are not in themselves the healthiest of cases. Of course a codicil made
after a legatee has died, of which fact the testator is aware, presents
a much stronger case for substitution than where there is no codicil
and the legatee is dead when the will is made; the fact of death may be,
and probably was, the occasion or reason for the codicil - something
which could not be true as to the making of the will. The mere fact,
however, that a codicil has been made after a legatee has died will not
prevent a lapse. See Coffin v. Elliott, 9 Richardson Equity 244 (S. C.
1857) where testatrix apparently knew of legatee's death.
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was a latent ambiguity or erroneous description in the clause
which could be resolved in favor of the claimants. The court
may have regarded this position of the claimants or the trial
judge as too tenuous to deserve consideration, and in any event
it would seem that there was neither a patent nor latent am-
biguity to justify giving to the words used any other than
their plain meaning.
26
Having concluded that the gift had lapsed or was void the
court held that the failure having occurred in the residuum
itself, the interest passed as intestate property, under the rule
announced in Davis v. Davis :27 "To the rule that a general re-
siduary clause will carry lapsed or ineffectual bequests of
personal property, and also devises of real estate, there is the
exception that lapsed or ineffectual legacies or devises of a
portion of the residuary estate itself, where the residuary
clause is to several devisees or legatees in common, do not
inure to the benefit of the residuary legatees or devisees, but
the interest of the deceased becomes intestate estate and as
such passes to the next of kin or heirs at law of the tes-
tator."
The case of Watson v. Wali28 which deals with the question
of renounced devises and their disposition is discussed in de-
tail under the subject of Trusts, and there the essential facts
26. The respondents argued simply that "When the testatrix said:
'to the child of my deceased sister, Elizabeth B. Padgett, to him abso-
lutely and forever,' she intended to say 'to the grandchildren of my
deceased sister, Elizabeth B. Padgett, to them absolutely and forever.'"
(f. 28, brief of respondents). The trouble with this argument is that
the will does not say so, and what the testatrix intended to say but did
not cannot form a part of the will. The function of interpretation is to
ascertain the meaning of the words used, and, in the language of the
older cases "any evidence is admissible which tends to explain and apply
what the testator has written; no evidence is admissible to show what
he intended to write." McCall v. McCall, 4 Richardson Equity 447, 455
(1852). A conjecture that the testatrix and her draftsman did not in-
tend a nugatory gift is of course reasonable: common sense would tell her
that she could not give property to a dead person, and her lawyer, not
only exercising common sense but knowing the law, would likewise be
aware of the futility of such a gift; and as a further application of
common sense, if the intention was to give to the respondents it would
have been the easiest thing, and the most natural, to say it in so many
plain words. Without going outside the record, the probability is that
there was forgetfulness on the testatrix's part: in forgetting the fact
at the time or in forgetting to tell her lawyer of the fact. On the other
hand, there are other possibilities, and the clause may have been the
result of some idiosyncrasy or some stubborn insistence, or the inad-
vertent or deliberate repetition of the same clause in an earlier will
made when the beneficiary was alive, and to which the present will was
not a codicil.
27. 208 S. C. 182, 37 S. E. 2d 530 (1946).
28. 229 S. C. 500, 93 S. E. 2d 918 (1956).
[Vol. 10
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are set out. The elements pertinent here are those relating to
the devises renounced by the State of South Carolina and the
County of Marion. The original parties in the suit had "con-
ceded," and it was so adjudged, that these devises passed
as intestate property. The Attorney General intervened on
leave of the Supreme Court and contested the correctness of
the ruling. He was successful in this effort. The court below
had apparently concluded that there was no residuary clause
to catch the devises. The Supreme Court's holding, in revers-
ing, was otherwise, the court concluding that "no particular
language is required to effect disposition of the entire re-
siduum of the estate," and that items three and ten of the
will were, in effect, general residuary clauses and the devises
so renounced passed into item three and the surplus of income
in that item thereupon passing into item ten. But in reaching
this conclusion the court had first to dispose of a troublesome
case which seemed to hold, contrary to the general rule,29
that a renounced gift, unlike a lapsed gift, could go only as
intestate property. This was the early case of Richardson v.
Sinkler,30 which held that a legacy, subject to conditions,
which the legatee refused to accept because of the conditions,
passed as intestate property despite the presence of a general
residuary clause, the court saying (p. 138) "because they are
expressly bequeathed to * * * [legatee] on certain conditions,
and not being bequeathed over in case of his refusal to accept
them, they must be considered as part of the testator's per-
sonal estate undisposed of and distributable." It is not clear
whether the decision is based on the presence of the conditions
or on the mere fact of refusal, but, aside from whatever
superficial distinctions there were in the two cases, the court
in the present case rejected the notion in the Richardson case
- thereby practically overruling it - that a renounced gift
must pass as intestate property. The court professed to see
no distinction between a lapsed and a renounced gift in the
light of the functions of a residuary clause and held that
equally applicable to a renounced gift is the rule on lapsed
gifts: "The rule that a lapsed devise or bequest passes under
the general residuary clause is founded not upon the assump-
tion that the testator foresaw the possibility of lapse, but
29. 57 Am. JuR., Wills, Secs. 1447, 1573 (1948), cited by the court.
See, also, as supporting the general rule that renounced gifts go into
a general residuary clause, unless the contrary intention is shown,
Annot. 155 A. L. R. 1420 (1945).
30. 2 DeSaussure Equity 127 (S. C. 1802).
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the presumption against partial intestacy 3oa * * * and the
corollary that, unless a contrary intention is apparent, the
general residuary clause is to be construed as including all of
the estate not otherwise effectually disposed of * * * [and]
presumably the testator intended to take away from the re-
siduary, only for the benefit of the particular, legatee." The
court pointed out that nothing in the will indicated an inten-
tion to have the property go to the heirs, whom he had al-
ready provided for, in the event of a renunciation, and this
being so the general rule, which it was thus accepting, would
cause the renounced devises to pass as residuary estate.
The remaining case under this heading, Rikard v. Miller,31
has been discussed under Ademption, and the essential facts
and terms of the will are there set out. The lower court and
the Supreme Court had found that ademption had taken place,
but the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding
that the proceeds of the adeemed gift had passed to the wife.
The lower court's action was based on the view that item
three of the will was a general residuary clause. The Supreme
Court's view was that the item was a restricted or limited
residuary disposition into which the proceeds did not go,
and that they passed as intestate property. This conclusion
was based on a reading of the will as a whole. The court de-
nied that the term "personal property" in Item three was in-
tended to be used in a comprehensive sense, and stated that
"while the term 'personal property' in its broadest legal sig-
nification, includes everything which is the subject of owner-
ship, except lands or interest in lands, we think here it was
used in a more restricted sense as including only goods and
chattels for personal use,"32 noting that the testator intended
to have the business go to his children and grandchildren in-
30a. Even with a general residuary clause in a will, the early law
was that lapsed devises would pass only as intestate property. Cheves
v. Haskell, 10 Richardson Equity 534 (1859). The rule was based on
the conception that a will of real estate spoke as of the time of its
execution, and as such was tied in with the rule as to after-acquired
real property. With the abolition of the rule as to after-acquired real
property in 1858, by what is now Sec. 19-231 of the 1952 Code, in effect
making a will of real property speak as of the time of death, it became
possible, and is now the law, that lapsed devises, like lapsed legacies,
can fall into a general residuary clause. Cureton v. Massey, 13 Richard-
son Equity 104 (S. C. 1866); Johnson v. Harrellson, 6 S. C. 336 (1875).
31. 231 S. C. 98, 97 S. E. 2d 257 (1957).
32. Citing Gist v. Craig, note 8, supra, and Quick v. Owens, 198 S. C.
29, 15 S. E. 2d 837, 137 A. L. R. 201 (1941), where the term was re-
garded as used in a restricted sense, the court in each case being aided
by the rule of ejusdem generis.
[Vol. 10
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tact (a purpose which he later defeated by its sale) and that
the business was not to be sold for payment of debts and
legacies until all other personal property had been resorted to.
The court also considered the technical aspects of the language
and place of the residuary clause, noting that "the terminology
used in item three is not that ordinarily found in a general
residuary clause.33 Also to be noted is that this clause ex-
cludes the property bequeathed in other portions of the will.84
Ordinarily such a provision is inserted at the conclusion of
the instrument.35 * * * All of these circumstances, while not
controlling, may properly be considered in determining the
nature of a residuary clause. The question after all is the
intention of the testator as evidenced by the language used
when considered in connection with the entire will."
As is usual in cases dealing with the question whether a
residuary clause is restricted or general, the court had to cope
with the presumption against partial intestacy - a presump-
tion which is one of the prime supports of a general residu-
ary clause. 38 The court pointed out that it did not overlook
the presumption, but stated "it is also not to be presumed
that the testator intended to disinherit his children. 3  Though
stated in the negative, this seems to be declaring a presump-
33. Note dictum in Haynsworth v. Cox, Harper Equity 117, 122 (S. C.
1824), where the court said: "If the testator intended to make a general
residuary bequest to his brother, why not say more simply and in the
usual way, 'I give all the rest and residue of my estate to my brother
* * * ." This is a most salutary admonition. But on the other hand,
as hereinbefore observed in Watson v. Wall, "no particular language is
required to effect disposition of the entire residuum of the estate," and
see similar language in Lopez v. Lopez, 23 S. C. 258 (1885), where the
words were "the balance of my estate."
34. See Swinton v. Egleston, 3 Richardson Equity 201 (S. C. 1851),
where the language was "I desire that all the property not specified
in this will" and it was held that a bequest to a slave which failed
because of the inability of the slave to take passed into the quoted
clause under the general rule that a general residuary clause catches
property not effectually disposed of as well as property not disposed of.
35. See Lopez v. Lopez, 23 S. C. 258 (1885) at p. 270, as to the posi-
tion of the residuary clause: "We cannot suppose that the character or
capacity of the seventh clause is changed in any way by being in the
body instead of at the end of the will. It would probably strike a lawyer
that the orderly method of proceeding would be to set down first the
provisions giving specific property, and then the clause intended to
cover everything that might remain undisposed of; but it is believed
that the relative position of the different clauses is purely arbitrary."
36. See Watson v. Wall, 229 S. C. 500, 93 S. E. 2d 918 (1957), herein-
before discussed.
37. It is to be noticed, however, that the testator did not disinherit
his children, having given them and his grandchildren his business by
item 3, and if the residuary clause had been unambiguously general
they would have been disinherited - not by the will, but by his own sub-
sequent act.
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tion against disinheritance, 38 and, if so, it is apparently, so
far as the writer knows, the first time it has been announced
in the state,535 although it is not unrelated to the construction
which favors the natural objects of a testator's bounty.39 In
keeping with its statement the court quotes from Page on
Wills:40 "Where a residuary clause is capable of two con-
structions, one of which making it a general residuary clause
will result in the exclusion of the testator's heirs, and the
other of which making it a particular residuary clause, will
leave a provision for testator's heirs under the intestate laws,
that provision will be preferred which leaves a provision for
the heirs." 41 And, finally, to indicate that it is not over-
whelmed by the presumption against intestacy, the court di-
rects attention to Charleston Library Society v. C. & S.
Bank, 42 where the court, after observing that the presumption
against intestacy is a rule of construction, declared that "the
mere fact that there is a residuary clause or other clause to
prevent intestacy does not in itself show that a particular de-
vise or bequest was intended by the testatrix to pass under
the residuary clause."
38. The presumption against disinheritance, which is not limited to
children, is commonly accepted elsewhere. See 2 PAGE, WILLS, Sec. 928
(3rd Ed. 1941): "In construing a will the presumptions on the subject
of disinheritance must be carefully balanced against those upon the
subject of partial intestacy, since the two are inconsistent in form.
Every reasonable construction in the will must be made in favor of
the heir; and he can be disinherited only by words which produce that
effect clearly and necessarily, either by express terms or by necessary
implication. Any ambiguity will be resolved in favor of the heir. ***
The presumption against intestacy is of no greater force than the pre-
sumption favor of the heir. The presumption in favor of the heir isof no greater force than the presum tion agai st intestacy. See, also,
to the same general effect 57 A1. Jun., Wills, Secs. 1160, 1161 (1948);
95 C. J. S., Wils, Sec. 616 (1957); n aas to construction 
in favor of
children and widow, 95 C. 3. 5., Wills, § 617 (1957).
38a. There is a suggestion of it in the court's approval of a catalogue
of rules in the argument of counsel in Davenport v. Collins, 161 S. C.
387, 428, 159 5. E. 787 (1931), one of them being "The law favors
the construction most nearly in conformity with the statute of distri-
butions."
39. Lemmon v. Wilson, 204 . C. 50,28 S. E. 2d 792 (1944).
40. See. 928, p. 856, Lifetime Edition. The excerpt quoted is under asection headed Presumption Against Disinheritance and is given as an
illustration-which implicitly is a recognition of the presumption by the
court.
41. This would necessarily have to be qualified somewhat where theresiduary taker is, as here, herself an heir; and as a widow is favored,
it would be doubtful that a construction would be given in favor of col-
lateral heirs.42. 200 v. C. 96, 20 S. E. 2d 623 (1942).
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Abatement
The case of Gaither v. U. S. Trust Co.43 involved the ques-
tion of what property an executor might, under the terms of
the will, use in discharging debts and estate and inheritance
taxes. While the case essentially is one of the substantive law
of wills - namely, the matter of abatement - the tax fea-
tures overshadow, although they flow from, the substantive
aspects of the litigation; and because of its tax importance,
the case is reviewed at length in this survey under the head
of Taxation. From the perspective of Wills it is desirable
to set out, repetitively, the pertinent facts and the relevant
portions of the will in controversy.
The plaintiff, husband of the testatrix, brought this action
for construction. Item I of the will provided: "I direct my
executor hereinafter named to pay all my just debts, last ill-
ness and funeral expenses, together with all taxes, State and
Federal, of whatever nature and kind, from cash on hand or
in Banks or such as shall come into his hands during the
administration of this will or from the sale or exchange of
any bonds, stocks or debentures of which I may be seized
and possessed if there is not sufficient cash." Item II be-
queathed to United States Trust Company of New York, de-
fendant and respondent, "all stocks, bonds, debentures now
in its possession and now handled by them for me under an
Agency Agreement, in trust * * * " with specified powers
and for the benefit of the husband and her daughter for their
lives, the corpus payable to grandchildren. By item III the
testatrix bequeathed to her daughter personal effects, furni-
ture and jewelry. Item IV provided: "All the rest, residue
and remainder of my property, real, personal or mixed, wher-
ever situated, located or found, I will, devise and bequeath
to my husband, H. Granger Gaither."
The value of the estate was $816,000. The securities held
by the trust company were valued at about $635,000. The
bonds and stocks in the testatrix's possession were valued
at about $160,000. The other assets of the estate, con-
sisting of cash, real estate and various items of personal
estate, were valued at about $20,000. Debts, estate and in-
heritance taxes amounted to about $250,000. Since the prop-
erty falling into the residuary estate was less than debts and
taxes, there would be no residuary estate after its applica-
43. 230 S. C. 568, 97 S. E. 2d 24 (1957).
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tion to these items unless the will provided an order of abate-
ment that would produce a different result. The husband
argued that there was such a direction in the will or at least
an authorization which permitted him to sell any of the se-
curities of the estate for the purpose of producing cash and
that he was not required to exhaust the securities in the re-
siduary estate. The lower court and the Supreme Court alike
rejected the husband's contention, holding that he should first
exhaust the residuary property before resorting to securities
in the hands of the trust company.
The Supreme Court reached its conclusion on certain well
established principles: that, unless otherwise prescribed by
the will, residuary property is first to be applied to the pay-
ment of debts and as between general legacies and specific
legacies the former abate first ;44 that the order prescribed by
law may be changed by the testator ;45 that these principles
are applicable to estate and inheritance taxes, and that the
"testator may designate the funds or property which shall
be burdened with taxes and free any and all other gifts from
diminution by estate or inheritance taxes :,46 and that *
"where there is a general direction to the executor to pay all
debts, costs of administration and taxes, there is an implied
direction that the taxes are to be paid from the fund which
also bears the burden of debts and expenses of administra-
tion" (citing cases from Connecticut, Wisconsin and Vir-
ginia.) The court then characterized the legacy of trust se-
44. Citing Warley v. Warley, Bailey Equity 397 (S. C. 1831); Brown
v. James, 3 Strobhart Equity 24 (S. C. 1849); Duncan v. Tobin, Dudley
Equity 161 (S. C. 1838). To which may be added, as to the prior resort
to residuary estate, Miller v. Mitchell, Bailey Equity 437 (S. C. 1831) ;
Jenkins v. Jenkins, Cheves Equity 129 (S. C. 1840); Gist v. Craig, 142
S. C. 407, 141 S. E. 26 (1927). The proposition is of course implicit in
the many cases concerned with the question of whether land in a blended
residue of real and personal property is implicitly charged with the
payment of legacies. Although residuary legacies are generically general
legacies, and general legacies abate ratably in the absence of contrary
intention, residuary legacies abate before other general legacies. Even
if the gift of the trust securities had been general rather than specific,
it would have abated after the residuary gift. See Jenkins v. Jenkins,
ante; Miller v. Mitchell, ante; Smith v. Heyward, 115 S. C. 145, 104 S. E.
473 (1920).
45. Citing Pell v. Ball's Ex'rs, Speer Equity 518 (S. C. 1844); Dray-
ton v. Rose, 7 Richardson Equity 328 (S. C. 1855): 57 Am. Jur., Wills,
Sec. 1468. To which may be added, among others, Pinckney v. Pinckney,
2 Richardson Equity 218 (S. C. 1846) ; Hull v. Hull, 3 Richardson Equity
65 (S. C. 1850) ; Hammett v. Hammett, 38 S. C. 50, 16 S. E. 839 (1892) ;
White v. Vaughan, 2 Hill Equity 329 (S. C. 1835); S. C. Nat. Bank v.
Bates, 175 S. C. 168, 178 S. E. 611 (1934).
46. Citing Patterson v. Cleveland, 165 S. C. 276, 163 S. E. 788 (1932).
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curities as specific, because it was separated and easily iden-
tifiable, and "unless the testatrix directed otherwise, they
could not be used to pay debts and taxes until the personal
property passing under the general residuary clause was
exhausted. ' 47 The court found, on a consideration of language
and circumstances, that there was no such direction and dis-
missed the husband's contention that the word "any",4-71
modifying "bonds, stocks or debentures" in Item I included
all securities she might own, the court limiting the securities
to those actually in her possession as distinguished from those
in possession of the trust company.
Finally, although, as the court noted, the issue was not
properly before it since it had not been raised below, the
court declined to permit an "equitable apportionment" which
would permit a ratable contribution between Items II and
IV to equalize the burden of debts and taxes, and resulting
in a tax saving, it being pointed out that nothing in the will
indicated any intention to provide for ratable contribution.
Whatever were the consequences, tax and otherwise, and
whether intended or unintended, of the phraseology of the
will, the will on its face seems so free of refinements, delicate
shadings or obscurities that any result other than that which
the court reached would have been surprising.
Rules of Construction
Practically every will case which does not involve probate
(execution, capacity, etc.), jurisdiction or procedure is one
that entails interpretation, or, in a broader sense, construc-
tion; and in every such case the rules of construction come
into play. No mention may be made of them in some cases but
they are at work nevertheless; in other cases some display
is made -of them, although in no case can it be said that all
of them are exhibited; and in other cases the rules figure as
prominently as the problem to be solved. So far in this sur-
vey every case discussed has been one of construction, and
the court with varying degrees of overt reference has re-
sorted to them. In the main the rules are the familiar
ones, and no new ones seem to have been introduced except
47. Quaere: As between the specific legacy of the securities and the
specific legacy of the jewelry, personal effects and furniture, would one
abate before the other?
47a. We have met "any" before. See Watson v. Watson, under Ademp-
tion.
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possibly the presumption against disinheritance, noted in the
discussion of Rikard v. Miller,48 under Ademption. Yet fa-
miliar and obvious as they are, the court has felt it necessary
in most of the cases already dealt with to emphasize them or
some of them again. Thus, in Padgett v. Black,49 there is the
statement of the principles that the cardinal rule of construc-
tion is to ascertain the intention of the testator; that "in de-
termining the intent * * * and in reaching a proper con-
struction of a will, a primary resort to the words used by the
[testator] is required. The inference as to a testator's intent
should be such as to leave no hesitation in the mind of the
court and must not rest upon speculation or conjecture. The
true intent must be gathered from the four corners of the
will." In Watson v. Wall, ° it is said "In our search for the
testator's intention, by which we must be governed in the
interpretation of his will, we must consider words, phrases,
clauses and sentences, not separately, but as part of, and in
their relation to, the whole instrument." And, in Rikard v.
Miller,51 it is stated "It is a fundamental rule that in con-
struing the provisions of a will, the intention of the testator
at the time the will is executed, is the primary inquiry of
the court. : * * In arriving at the intention of the testator
the will must be read and considered as a whole."
The rules themselves occupied a more prominent place than
the problem in Spell v. Traxler.52 The action was for specific
performance of a land contract. The complaint alleged that
the plaintiff, C. A. Spell, had contracted to sell to the de-
fendant a parcel of land owned by him in fee simple; that he
had acquired the land by the will of one Anna Prudence
Spell; that "Item 3 of said will reads as follows: 'In the event
that Henry A. Spell should die before his father, C. A. Spell,
it is my will that the executors hereinafter named handle this
estate to the one in the family that is most worthy and bene-
ficial.'" The complaint further alleged that after the death
of Henry A. Spell the executors had conveyed the land to the
plaintiff.
The defendant demurred on the ground that the complaint
on its face showed that the plaintiff did not have a fee simple
title and thus could not perform the contract. The demurrer
48. 231 S. C. 98, 97 S. E. 2d 257 (1957).
49. 229 S. C. 142, 92 S. E. 2d 153 (1956).
50. 229 S. C. 500, 93 S. E. 2d 918 (1956).
51. 231 S. C. 98, 97 S. E. 2d 257 (1957).
62. 229 S. C. 446, 93 S. E. 2d 601 (1956).
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was overruled by the lower court, and this action was sus-
tained on appeal.
In approaching the problem as to the interpretation of the
expression "that the executors hereinafter named handle this
estate to the one in the family that is most worthy and bene-
ficial," the court said that the following principles were appli-
cable: "1. All rules of construction are directed towards the
ascertainment of what the testator intended by the language
used in his will, and to the effectuation of that intention if it
be consistent with law. * * * 2. The law abhors intestacy
53
and will indulge every presumption in favor of the will. ': * *
3. The testator's intention need not be declared in express
terms if it can be clearly inferred from particular provisions
and from the general scope and import of the will. :. *
4. The testator's intention is to be gathered from the whole
instrument, its doubtful language being considered in the
light of circumstances known to the testator at the time of
its execution. * * * 5. If the testator's intention can be
clearly perceived, and is not contrary to some positive rule of
law, it must prevail even though it involves the rejection or
addition of words or a change in their literal meaning."
The whole will was not set out in the complaint (although
improperly included in the transcript and on that account
not considered) and the court, upholding the denial of the
demurrer, did so on the ground given by the lower court:
that the demurrer admitted the allegation of fee simple owner-
ship which was not clearly negatived by the quoted fragments
from the will. The court did not undertake to construe the
quoted provision since the whole will was not before it, saying
that "whatever doubt as to the intention of the testatrix may
be occasioned by her use of the quoted expression is to be
resolved from consideration of the will as a whole in the light
of the principles of construction to which we have referred,
53. This is pretty strong language, particularly when there are con-
sidered the presumption against disinheritance discussed in the residue
case of Rikard v. Miller and the lack of reluctance on the part of the
court there to find partial intestacy, but the language is not uncommon.
See 57 Am. JUR., Wills, Sec. 1158 (1948): "An intestacy is a dernier
resort in the construction of wills, and the abhorrence of courts to intes-
tacy under a will has been lilened to the abhorrence of nature to a
vacuum." This is certainly appropriate where there is a total vacuum,
resulting in the complete nullification of the dispositive provisions of a
will - as if a will had not been made -, as was the case of Daven-
port v. Collins, 161 S. C. 387, 159 S. E. 787 (1931), but whether that
revulsion ought to apply to partial intestacy is, at least to the writer's
mind, doubtful.
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and that the said expression is not upon its face so devoid
of meaning or so impossible of interpretation as to render the
complaint demurrable." 54
Contract to Make Will
As in every previous year of the survey the Supreme Court
had before it in the period under review a case involving an
alleged contract to make a will. Such cases usually turn on
contract law as much as, if not more than, the law of wills,
and the case of Dean v. Dean5 5 is no exception. The facts
are unusual, in that there was agreement, but only up to a
point, and the failure to go beyond it to reach full consumma-
tion proved fatal. The action was one to enforce an alleged
contract to make a will. The facts were that the mother of
the plaintiff and defendants was one of the heirs of her
intestate husband and that she and her four children entered
into a written agreement whereupon the children assigned
to her their income from the inherited real estate, for her
life, in order to provide her with ample support, she to carry
taxes, insurance and repairs. Another agreement was later
prepared and signed by all the children except one, the instru-
ment on its face showing that it was between the mother and
all the children, similar to the first agreement but agreeing
on the mother's part to devise her interest to her children,
with substitutional provisions in the event of the death of
any of them. The mother later died, leaving a will devising
her property to certain grandchildren.
The master and the circuit judge held against the alleged
contract, on the ground that the second contract contemplated
the execution by all four children and was a joint one, and
that not having been executed by all the anticipated parties
it never became effective. The Supreme Court affirmed on
the stated grounds. Much of the opinion is taken up with
the nature of joint and joint and several contracts (the con-
clusion here being that it was joint) but it would seem that
whether it was one or the other would be a matter of no
54. The buyer could hardly be blamed in this case for rejecting the
title, although it might on judicial interpretation turn out to be good,
an interpretation which could not be given with finality without all
parties having a possible interest before the court - which might not
have been the fact here. Schroder v. Antipas, 215 S. C. 87, 51 S. E. 2d
367 (1949). Apparently the defendant fell short at the outset in the
manner of his defense. Just what the plaintiff did own will almost cer-
tainly have to be judicially determined, unless time will give the merciful
healing of adverse possession.
55. 229 S. C. 430, 93 S. E. 2d 206 (1956).
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consequence if the condition of signing was - and so it ap-
peared here - that all should sign.
Lord Campbel's Act
The case of Campbell's Auto Transit, Inc. v. Bass56 is re-
viewed under Pleading and reference to it there will give
the essential facts and law. From the Wills point of view,
as it relates to executors and administrators, attention need
be paid only to the discussion in the case of the function of
an executor or administrator with respect to actions for
wrongful death and actions under the Survival Act. This
excerpt from the opinion points up the vital differences so
far as the present case, under its facts, is concerned: "Ap-
pellant suggests that the only real differences between the
functions of the executrix as representative of the estate
on the one hand and as representative of the statutory bene-
ficiaries on the cause of action for wrongful death on the
other is in relation to the distribution of the proceeds of
recovery in her hands. But the distinction is deeper than that.
For example, recovery against her on the cause of action for
property damage would not operate to reduce by a penny her
recovery on the cause of action for wrongful death. Nor
could recovery by her on the cause of action for wrongful
death offset her liability under a judgment against her for
the property damages. The two clauses - her own against
respondent for wrongful death, and respondent's against her
for property damage - are in no wise reciprocal. In reality,
she functions under two separate and distinct trusteeships
having no relation to each other beyond the fact that their
origin is referable to the death of the same person. ' ' 57
LEGISLATION
Two important pieces of legislation in the field of Wills were
enacted in the 1957 session of the General Assembly. One re-
lates to the age of testators, and the other to the effect of
delay of probate of a will upon purchasers and encumbrances.
By Act signed by the Governor on July 15, 1957,8 Section
19-201 of the 1952 Code was amended to permit married per-
sons of the age of eighteen to make wills. In its amended
form the statute reads: "The real and personal property
56. 229 S. C. 607, 93 S. E. 2d 912 (1956).
57. For discussion of the nature of the trusteeship under the wrongful
death statutes, see 1956 Annual Survey, 9 S. C. L. Q. 164-166.
58. Act No. 387, 50 Stat. 568.
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of any person may be disposed of by will, but no will of real
or personal property shall be valid unless the testator or tes-
tatrix, at the time of making thereof, was of sound mind and
either of the age of twenty-one years, or married and above
the age of eighteen years."
It is to be assumed that some practical considerations dic-
tated the exception in favor of married persons. It is de-
batable that married persons over eighteen but under twenty-
one have greater mental capacity than single persons in the
same age group (and some cynics may argue that marriage at
such an age indicates the lack of it), but there may be the ele-
ment of a greater sense of responsibility and the need of per-
miting a married man or woman to make a suitable disposi-
tion of his or her estate to take care of a new and young fam-
ily. But since requirements as to age are based generally on
supposed capacity to understand rather than on other factors,
it would have seemed more logical to reduce the age for all
persons, married and unmarried, to eighteen - a suggestion
made in 1949 by the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law
Reform of the South Carolina Bar Association.59 It recom-
mended that "The same age requirements should be prescribed
as to all wills, whether of real or personal property, without
regard to sex." It was pointed out that there was no longer
any valid distinction between real and personal property, and
that the statutory requirement that a testator be twenty-one
years to make a will of real property and the non-statutory
rule that a valid will of personalty might be made by a female
of the age of twelve and by a male of the age of fourteen(0
were substantially inconsistent and unrealistic. A secondary
recommendation was that the age be raised in the case of
personal property, and reduced in the case of real property,
to eighteen. In 1951 the General Assembly - whether because
of the recommendation or not is a matter of conjecture -
went along at least part of the way by making the same age
requirement without regard to sex or character of property,
namely, twenty-one.
There are a few - a very few - states that make a dis-
tinction between married and single testators. So far as this
distinction is adopted in this State, it is, confessedly, all to
the good. But married persons under twenty-one still labor
59. 1 S. C. L. Q. 327 (June, 1949).
60. Posey v. Posey, 3 Strobhart Law 167 (S. C. 1848) ; Major v. Hunt,
64 S. C. 97, 41 S. E. 816 (1901).
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under the same contractual and other disabilities as do un-
married minors,60a and it has never been seriously suggested
- short of reducing the age of majority below twenty-one -
that exceptions be made in this area. Since, however, it has
been said that "ordinarily one need not have full contractual
capacity in order to make a will"6 - which is tantamount
to saying that it requires less capacity to make a will than
a contract - there still seems no valid reason for not making
the age requirement eighteen without regard to the single
or married state of the testator.
The other legislation which became law without the Gover-
nor's signature on June 17, 1957,(2 is an amendment to Sec-
tion 19-266 of the 1952 Code. In its amended form it is as
follows: "Every last will and testament, including any codicil
or codicils thereto, shall be null and void as to subsequent pur-
chasers or encumbrances without notice of property devised
or bequeathed by the will unless the same be filed for probate
in one of the modes allowed by law within six months after
the death of the testator."
The change in the statute consists of substituting "six
months" for "one year", originally appearing. The amendment
is in keeping with the comprehensive legislation of 195668
which was designed to facilitate and expedite the administra-
tion of estates, particularly by shortening the periods required
for the doing of necessary acts.
60a. There is a statutory exception which permits renunciation of
dower by a minor wife. CODE OF LAWS OF S. C., 1952 §§ 19-112, 19-113.
61. McCullum v. Banks, 213 S. C. 476, 50 S. E. 2d 199 (1948).
62. Act No. 369, 50 Stat. 547.
6a. Act No. 767, 49 Stat. 1785, reviewed in 1956 Survey, 9 S. C. L. Q.
168-178.
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